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This tenth survey covers the legislative changes in the Workmen's
Compensation Act1 which were adopted by the 1970 and 1971 session of
the Florida Legislature, and all related, reported judicial decisions since
publication of the last survey.2
The 1970 legislature adopted eleven amendments and repealed three
subsections of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The effect of this legisla-
tive action was to provide that employers and employees covered by the
Workmen's Compensation Act could no longer reject the Act, thereby
making workmen's compensation coverage compulsory, effective Septem-
ber 1, 19 70 .' The 1971 session further amended the statute to eliminate
* Member of the Florida Bar.
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 440.
2. This survey includes cases appearing in volumes 219 through 250 of the Southern
Reporter, Second Series, and laws enacted by the 1970 and 1971 sessions of the Florida
Legislature. Florida Workmen's Compensation, 1935-1950 Survey of Florida Law, 5 Ma
L.Q. 74 (1950); Clements, Workmen's Compensation, 1950-1959 Survey of Florida Law, 8
MIAMI L.Q. 469 (1954); Schroll, Workmen's Compensation, 1954-1959 Survey of Florida
Law, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 154 (1959); Schroll, Workmen's Compensation, 1959-1961 Survey
of Florida Law, 16 U. MIAMi L. REV. 216 (1961); Schroll, Workmen's Compensation, 1961-
1963 Survey of Florida Law, 18 U. MIAY L. REv. 398 (1963); Schroll, Workmen's Com-
pensation, 1963-1965 Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MIAMI L. Riv. 277 (1965); Schroll,
Workmen's Compensation, 1965-1967 Survey of Florida Law, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 608
(1968); Schroll, Workmen's Compensation, 1967-1969 Survey of Florida Law, 24 U. MAI
L. REv. 516 (1970).
3. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-148, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 440.03, 440.05, 440.06 (1969),
repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 440.04(1), 440.07, 440.08 (1969).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
the validity of any agreement by the employee to waive his rights under
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
4
The exclusive remedy of workmen's compensation and elimination
of other liability of the employer was fortified by the 1970 legislative ses-
sion. The employer's immunity was extended to the workmen's compen-
sation insurance carrier, service agent, or safety consultant when assisting
the employer in carrying out the employer's rights and responsibilities
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. When such persons furnish
any safety inspection, safety consultant service, or other safety service
incidental to the workmen's compensation or employer's liability coverage
or to the workmen's compensation or employer's liability servicing con-
tract, they too will have the immunity of an employer. A limitation of the
exclusion from liability was included in those circumstances where the
injury or death is proximately caused by willful or unprovoked physical
aggression or by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the em-
ployees, officers, or directors of the insurance carrier, safety agent, or
safety consultant of the employer.' The 1971 legislative session extended
the employer's exclusive liability to apply to third party tort-feasors.'
These two legislative changes were, in large measure, the result of judicial
decisions.7
The 1970 legislative session increased the weekly compensation bene-
fits from 49 to 56 dollars.8 Also, the session added a provision for payment
of an additional forty weeks of temporary total disability benefits where
an individual, though having reached maximum medical improvement,
is undergoing rehabilitative efforts.9 Attempts were made to provide for
deduction of compensation previously paid for preexisting permanent
partial disability where the preexisting disability merges with a subse-
quent permanent partial disability from and injury or occupational disease.
However, it is provided that in no event shall the compensation for the
subsequent permanent partial disability be less than that allowed for the
degree of disability that would have resulted from the subsequent injury
or occupational disease if the previous disability had not existed. The
deduction appears to be limited to workmen's compensation benefits pre-
viously paid under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act for perma-
nent partial disability, impairment, or disease.10 Through further amend-
ment, the 1970 legislative session required the employer or carrier to give
thirty days notice to the injured employee of his intention to institute
suit against a third party tort-feasor in those instances where the injured
4. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136, amending FLA. STAT. § 440.21 (1969).
5. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(2) (Supp. 1970).
6. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-190, amending FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (Supp. 1970).
7. See sections XVIII and XIX infra.
8. FLA. STAT. § 440.12 (Supp. 1970).
9. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(2) (Supp. 1970).
10. FaA. STAT. § 440.15(5) (C) (Supp. 1970).
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employee fails to bring the suit within one year from the date of accrual
of the action.1
The number of Judges of Industrial Claims was increased to twenty-
five in 1970, and authority was given to the Division to require revocation
of a carrier's license if the insurance carrier fails to comply with its obliga-
tions under the Workmen's Compensation Act.' 2 The 1971 legislative
session extended the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act to
turpentine labor, labor in processing gum spirits of turpentine, crude
gum, oleo rosin, and gum rosin (these employees having been previously
excluded),"3 and brought partial coverage to agricultural labor. 4 In addi-
tion, the salaries of Judges of Industrial Claims was increased from
$18,500 to $22,500 per year. 5 Lastly, these provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act permitting fines and punishments were generally over-
hauled. Violations of the act are second degree misdemeanors, and punish-
ment is provided for in accordance with sections 775.082 and 775.083 of
the Florida statutes. 6 Additional language changes were made in various
sections to comply with the language used under the Governmental Re-
organization Act of 1969.
One hundred thirty-four judicial opinions dealing with workmen's
compensation were handed down by the Supreme Court of Florida during
the period covered by this survey. An additional fourteen opinions were
issued by the district courts of appeal.
I. SPECIAL DISABILITY FUND
The statutory procedure of having the responsibility of the Special
Disability Fund determined by a separate proceeding 7 was commented on
in the case of Cypress Gardens Citrus Products, Inc. v. Murchison."5 In
that case, the claimant had preexisting degenerative disc disease and
arthritis at the time he sustained two separate back injuries. It was deter-
mined that the claimant suffered a 37 percent medical disability of which
12 percent was due to the latter accident and 25 percent due to the pre-
existing degenerative disc disease and arthritis. The result of both condi-
tions was permanent total disability. The supreme court reviewed the
statements contained in the order awarding permanent total disability as
well as its prior decisions and stated:
Certain allusions and language used in some of this Court's
11. FLA. STAT. § 440.39(4) (Supp. 1970).
12. FLA. STAT. § 440.45(1) (Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. § 440.52 (Supp. 1970).
13. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-80, repealing FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1)(c)(5) (1969).
14. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-80, amending FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1)(e)(3) (1969).
15. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-290, amending FLA. STAT. § 440.45(3) (Supp. 1970).
16. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-136, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 440.13(2), 440.21(1), 440.34
(3)(b), 440.37, 440.38(4)(b), 440.43, 440.46(1)(c) (1969).
17. FLA. STAT. § 440.49 (1969).
18. 240 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1970).
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opinions may have given the impression that the Judge of In-
dustrial Claims has a duty in the original claim to make certain
findings and an allocation of the cause of disability to use in and
govern claim proceedings for reimbursement from the Special
Disability Fund. Such findings as whether there was a merger
between the pre-existing condition or disease and the industrial
accident, the proportion of disability attributable to each cause,
and whether the employer knew of the pre-existing condition or
not are findings which, if made by the Judge of Industrial Claims
in the original claim proceeding, cannot bind in any manner
whatsoever the findings and conclusions to be made in a separate
proceeding against the Special Disability Fund. Any language
in prior decisions which might have unfortunately implied to
the contrary is hereby clarified. Although if members of the
Legislature we might have written the law differently in such a
manner as to require the Fund to appear as a party in any case
involving possible Fund liability, the law is not so structured
and any comments from this bench implying otherwise are con-
trary to its clear intent."
The separate claim concept contained in the statute has continued
through the 1970 and 1971 sessions of the legislature. This concept was
factually emphasized in the combined cases of Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. v. Special Disability Fund and Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company v. Special Disability Fund.2" The cases involved an employee
who was injured in three separate accidents while employed by the City
of Hialeah. He was found to have sustained a 15 percent permanent
partial disability and 14 percent loss of wage earning capacity as a result
of the first accident, a 28 percent loss of wage earning capacity from the
second accident, and a 28 percent loss of wage earning capacity from the
third accident. The claimant had been paid the 14 percent disability
resulting from the first accident by the time of the award of compensation
for the second and third accidents. Workmen's compensation insurance
coverage was afforded by two different companies on the second and third
accidents and both companies subsequently made a claim against the
Special Disability Fund for reimbursement. Through separate proceed-
ings, it was found that the 28 percent disability award for the second
accident was the result of the merged effect of the first accident and the
second accident and that the second accident caused one-half of the 28
percent disability awarded. Thus the carrier on the second accident
was entitled to reimbursement from the Special Disability Fund. A
similar finding was made on the third accident. On review, the In-
dustrial Relations Commission reversed the reimbursement awards.
The Commission believed that the claimant had an overall 70
percent loss of wage earning capacity as a result of all three accidents
19. Id. at 806-07.
20. 249 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1971).
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which the carriers were not ordered to pay. In addition, the total award of
56 percent was directly attributable to the second and third accidents
and, therefore, no excess had been provided to the claimant by either of
the carriers. Thus, there were no amounts paid out for which the Special
Disability Fund should be responsible. In reversing the Commission and
reinstating the reimbursement award, the supreme court modified its
prior decision of Cypress Gardens Citrus Products, Inc. v. Murchison2
and stated:
In most cases the entire disability will and should be provided
for by employer-carrier in successive injury or pre-existing dis-
ability or disease cases, but an anomalous situation of this kind
(being pre-Stephens and Evans) should not go unreimbursed by
the Fund in the face of an uncontradicted finding of 'excess'
compensation being made in a merger case. Our holding in the
Cypress Garden Citrus Products case was not intended to legally
preclude reimbursement from the Fund of pro-tanto 'excess'
liability payments of employers or carriers but rather was a state-
ment of the fact that employer-carrier in most cases compensates
a handicapped worker for his entire disability where his pre-
existing condition is known to employer. 2
The concept of merger of successive disabilities was before the court
in the case of Davis v. Conger Life Insurance Company.3 In that case,
the claimant suffered a heart attack which resulted in his absence from
work for approximately ninety days. He returned to his job with the
understanding that his hours of actual work would be less than before
the accident. Subsequently, and while employed by the same company,
the claimant suffered a compensable injury to his back, i.e., a herniated
disk. An award was entered on the finding that the claimant had sustained
a 25 percent permanent partial disability of the body as a whole as a
result of the heart attack and a 15 percent permanent partial disability of
the body as a whole resulting from the herniated disc. The two injuries
merged to cause a total loss of wage earning capacity. In affirming the
award, the court rejected the argument of the employer and carrier that
no merger took place since the injuries involved were not related. Rather,
the court gave the term "merger" a broader construction and stated:
Reinjury to a previously injured part of the body is not the only
way merger can occur. Merger can result from successive injuries
to separate parts of the body which have the combined total
effect of creating a greater degree of disability to the body as a
whole and a claimant's wage-earning capacity than would have
21. 240 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1970).
22. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Special Disability Fund, 249 So.2d 673,
676-77 (Fla. 1971).
23. 201 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1967).
19721
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
resulted from the last injury considered by itself and not in con-
junction with a previous injury.24
The court further stated:
Merger is not a condition that automatically arises upon the
mere occurrence of successive injuries which may or may not
have a combined disabling effect upon a claimant within the
contemplation of the Workmen's Compensation statute. It is a
condition the finding and determination of which must be sup-
ported by competent substantial evidence in accord with logic
and reason in order to be compensable. 5
Awards were entered in several other cases on the basis of merger
of successive disabilities. For example, an award of full benefits was
upheld where a five percent disability to a leg was found to have merged
with a prior back condition to result in 50 percent permanent partial
disability.26 A permanent total award was made based upon the merging of
a job-connected, 25 percent disability of the right knee and a preexisting
amputation of a right hand and left leg." The court allowed a permanent
total award resulting from an aggravation and merger of an acci-
dent producing traumatic colitis in a claimant who was suffering
from preexisting psychiatric conditions. 8 Also, the supreme court upheld
an award of permanent total disability resulting from successive back
injuries which produced no disability until the last accident.2"
In San Juan v. Hart Properties, Inc.,3" a claimant had sustained
a low back injury for which he was being compensated for 20 percent
permanent partial disability. While employed by the same employer,
he sustained a second injury resulting in a five percent disability of the
neck. The Judge of Industrial Claims found that the two disabilities
merged and awarded the claimant compensation benefits for a 25 percent
permanent partial disability. However, the award also provided that the
employer be given credit for all permanent partial disability payments
previously paid. On review, it was held that the claimant was entitled to
the full 25 percent permanent partial disability without credit for any of
the prior compensation benefits already paid on the 20 percent preexisting
disability. However, the court went on to hold that any compensation due
and remaining for the prior 20 percent disability need not be paid once
payments are commenced on the second or merged injury.
The failure to apply the provisions of the Special Disability Fund
was found to represent a denial of essential requirements of law in the
24. Id. at 729.
25. Id. at 730.
26. Harris v. Lenk, 224 So.2d 283 (Fla. 1969).
27. Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Garvey, 234 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1970).
28. Golden Isles Pavillion v. Stamford, 234 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1970).
29. Steele v. Pendarvis Chevrolet, Inc., 220 So.2d 372 (Fla. 1969).
30. 248 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1971). For the legislative change regarding credit, see FLA. STAT.
§ 440.15 (5) (c) (Supp. 1970).
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case of Williams v. North Broward Hospital District.3 In that case, the
claimant suffered from preexisting degenerative spinal disease which was
progressive but with which she was able to work. She slipped while work-
ing and sustained a fracture of the left hip. Medical care and compensa-
tion benefits were provided for the hip fracture. Upon attaining maximum
medical recovery, the claimant was voluntarily compensated for a five
percent disability of the leg. A claim for permanent total disability bene-
fits was denied by the Judge of Industrial Claims, who found the claimant
was totally disabled and had no earning capacity at the time of her
accident. In reversing the case and remanding it for reconsideration, the
court noted that the result reached by the Judge of Industrial Claims was
paradoxical. The claimant was working on her job, admittedly with an
open, obvious disability known to the employer. Her work was passable
and the Judge of Industrial Claims did not consider her employer-known
preexisting disability apportionable as a predicate for Special Disability
Fund consideration.
II. APPORTIONMENT
The doctrine of apportionment was held to be inapplicable in the
case of Tracy v. Americana Hotel.3" In that case, the claimant, a chamber-
maid, became irritated when a coemployee removed linen from her cart.
After obtaining new linen and while still upset, the claimant threw a
sheet across a bed she was making. Suddenly the claimant collapsed,
having sustained a ruptured aneurysm as a result of a significant rise in
blood pressure. The Judge of Industrial Claims apportioned the perma-
nent disability arising out of the accident in equal measure with the
preexisting hypertensive disease. On certiorari, the supreme court reviewed
its prior decisions and reversed the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims.
The supreme court stated:
[A]pportionment only applies where the preexisting disease is
shown to produce disability manifested at the time of the accident
or where due to normal progress, independent of the accident,
such disease is shown to produce disability at the time of the
award. There is no substantial evidence in this case that claim-
ant's hypertensive disease was subject to percentage apportion-
ment as a disabling element.3 8
The necessity of adequate findings of fact where preexisting dis-
abilities of diseases are involved was restated in Hardware Mutual Insur-
ance Company v. Cardwell.4 There, the Judge of Industrial Claims
acknowledged the facts requiring apportionment, but then found appor-
31. 247 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1971).
32. 234 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1970).
33. Id. at 643.
34. 227 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1969).
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tionment was not indicated. After noting the inconsistency in the order of
the Judge of Industrial Claims, the supreme court remanded the cause. The
supreme court stated that a proper ruling on apportionment is essential
to the employer's right to proceed against the Special Disability Fund for
reimbursement. Furthermore, the determination of the "excess compensa-
tion" that the employer is required to pay must be made at the time the
claim for compensation is adjudicated.85
III. HEART CASES
During the period surveyed, the two cases involving heart attacks,
being factual only, left the law in heart cases unchanged. In Warman
v. Metropolitan Dade County, 6 the claimant was a 54-year-old heavy
equipment operator who suffered a heart attack while digging and chop-
ping weeds. He was doing the work to determine what would be necessary
to complete the job with the heavy equipment he was operating. Under
the facts of the case, the digging was unusual activity and resulted in the
heart attack. An award of compensation benefits was reinstated by the
supreme court under the competent substantial evidence rule. In Clayton
v. Lease-Way Transportation Corp.,37 the claimant, a driver of a concrete
mixer truck, suffered a myocardial infarction one minute after picking
up and throwing aside a mortar-covered plank weighing from 50 to 75
pounds. He had cast the plank aside to prevent him and his helper from
tripping over it while unloading the concrete. The court reinstated an
award of compensation benefits and stated:
[W]hen disabling heart attacks are involved and where such
heart conditions are precipitated by work-connected exertion
affecting a pre-existing non-disabling heart disease, such injuries
are compensable only if the employee was at the time subject to
unusual strain or over-exertion not routine to the type of work
he was accustomed to performing.8
Both of the foregoing cases were affirmed under the theory of competent
substantial evidence to support the award.
IV. DISABILITY BENEFITS
A. Occupational Diseases
In the only occupational disease case reported during the period
surveyed, a reversal of an award for compensation benefits was quashed
35. For the application of the doctrine of apportionment without utilization of the
Special Disability Fund, see Lane v. Pipeline Constr. Co., 222 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1969) (dissent-
ing opinion).
36. 228 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1969).
37. 236 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1970).
38. Id. at 766.
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and the cause was remanded. 9 The disease involved in the case was
contact dermatitis which allegedly developed by the use of "Tide," a
detergent provided by the employer and used in cleaning baking tables.
Despite the inadequacies of the record, the court remanded the cause to
afford the claimant an additional opportunity to meet the requirements of
the occupational disease section of the statute which requires the identifi-
cation of the chemicals involved and the manner and amount of exposure.
The court pointed out that if the substance causing the dermatitis was
shown to be a common household detergent, the Judge of Industrial
Claims must find that the extent and manner of the claimant's exposure
exceeded that of the general public so as to constitute a "particular hazard"
of her employment as required by the statute. The court emphasized that
evidence adequate to establish other types of compensation claims is not
sufficient to meet the requirements of the occupational disease section of
the statute. °
In Brito v. Advance Metal Products, Inc.,41 a welder was exposed to
smoke while welding over a period of six years. He developed a sudden
inability to breathe through his nose while welding. A physician charac-
terized the condition as one caused by the fumes and smoke which came
from welding. The Judge of the Industrial Claims found it to have been
an accident, but he was reversed by the Industrial Relations Commission
on its determination that the claimant had not been exposed to more
smoke than he normally encountered in his work. The Commission also
found that fumes other than from welding, such as automobile fumes or
those from smoking, could also cause a condition from which the claimant
was suffering. In quoting from prior decisions, the supreme court quashed
the reversal by the Industrial Relations Commission and reinstated the
award on the accident theory rather than upon an occupational disease
theory. The court noted that the fundamental accidental nature of the
injury was not altered by the fact that, instead of a single occurrence, it
was the cumulative effect of inhalation of dust and fumes to which the
claimant was peculiarly susceptible.
B. Temporary Benefits
Temporary disability benefits of a continuing nature were awarded
a claimant in Canfield v. Concreform Company.42 The award was for con-
tinuing temporary partial disability to a claimant who had sustained a
broken leg while employed on a summer job as a carpenter. The claimant
regularly attended college during the day and worked at night as a gas
station attendant. Following the injury, the claimant returned to college
39. Norman v. Morrison Food Service, 245 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1971).
40. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(1) (Supp. 1970).
41. 244 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1971).
42. 243 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1971).
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for the fall term but failed to reach maximum medical improvement. The
employer paid temporary total disability until October and then offered
the claimant a daytime job as a lookout, which the claimant declined to
accept. Medical testimony established that the lookout job, if it required
prolonged standing and exposure to hazards of falling on rough ground
on construction sites, was not advisable. The court, in upholding an award
of temporary partial disability, noted that the claimant was unable to
work as a carpenter or as a service station attendant and was not required
to accept the job as a lookout. His school attendance was held to be
immaterial.
The maximum statutory limitation of 350 weeks for temporary total
disability was imposed in Thompson v. Industrial Commission." The
claimant continued as temporarily totally disabled but without further
receipt of compensation for this classification of disability. The denial of
temporary total disability was reversed in Bays v. Board of County Com-
missioners.44 The court held that the quality of the evidence proffered by
the claimant was sufficiently competent and substantial as opposed to the
defenses which did not have the same quality. The defenses were merely
inferences which were insufficient to deny the claimant's status as tem-
porarily and totally disabled.
Temporary total disability was defined as the healing period during
which the claimant is totally unable to work due to his injury. It con-
tinues as long as recovery and lasting improvement of the injured person's
condition can reasonably be expected. The date of maximum improvement
marks the end of temporary disability and the beginning of permanent
disability. Determination of the maximum recovery date which marks the
end of temporary disability is not to be determined by hindsight.
The nature of medical treatment is not to be determined by the
ultimate success or failure of the treatments. Treatments are
curative in nature if administered or prescribed by a qualified
physician with the reasonable expectation that they will bring
about some degree of recovery.
In McMahon v. Huntington,46 a claimant reached maximum medical
recovery but was suffering from a chronic anxiety reaction. An examining
physician felt that the claimant needed further psychiatric treatment but
that the best treatment would be for him to begin working again. There-
fore the finding of the Judge of Industrial Claims that the claimant reached
maximum medical recovery was upheld.
43. 224 So.2d 286 (Fla. 1969). A special concurring opinion indicated that the decision
should be without prejudice so as to allow establishment of an early maximum recovery date
and the institution retroactively of permanent total disability benefits.
44. 232 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1970).
45. Corral v. McCrory Corp., 228 So.2d 900, 902-03 (Fla. 1969).
46. 246 So.2d 743 (Fla. 1971).
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C. Permanent Disability Benefits
In all compensation cases dealing with a permanent partial disability,
a finding of maximum medical improvement is essential.47 Disability for
compensation purposes is grounded both on loss of wage earning capacity
and on actual physical impairment. In measuring the loss of wage earning
capacity no single factor is conclusive. In Walker v. Electronic Products
Engineering Company,48 the supreme court summarized the criteria an-
nounced in prior decisions by which loss of wage earning capacity may be
measured as follows:
1. Extent of actual physical impairment;
2. Claimant's age;
3. Industrial history;
4. Education of claimant;
5. Inability to obtain work of a type which claimant can perform
in light of his after-injury condition;
6. Wages actually earned after the injury (a factor entitled
to great weight);
7. Claimant's ability to compete in the open labor market for
the remainder of his life, including the burden of pain or
inability to perform the required labor;
8. Claimant's continued employment in the same employ.49
In Abbenant v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,"0 the previous judicial
holdings regarding permanent total disability were restated. The court
held that where a worker's injury permits him to perform only limited
services so that a reasonable job in the market does not exist, he may be
classified as totally disabled under the Florida Workmen's Compensation
Law. A workman does not have to be absolutely helpless for all purposes
to be classified as totally disabled under the act.
In Ross v. Roy,5 an award of 50 percent permanent partial disability
to the body as a whole, resulting from a broken leg suffered by a 63-year-
old claimant possessing a third grade education, was reversed. The court
held that the record justified the finding that the claimant was permanently
and totally disabled within the meaning of the Florida Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. The court's conclusion was not affected by the scheduled
nature of the claimant's original injury, since the impact of the scheduled
injury had been eliminated by the finding of permanent total disability. 52
47. Brock v. Sey Constr. Corp., 237 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1970).
48. 248 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1971). For a competent substantial evidence case involving an
award of 40 percent loss of wage earning capacity, see Tenbroeck v. North Broward Hosp.
Dist., 243 So.2d 592 (Fla. 1971).
49. Walker v. Electronic Prod. Eng'r Co., 248 So.2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1971).
50. 241 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1970). Here, the Judge of Industrial Claims found the claimant
to be 50 percent disabled and apportioned the 50 percent award. The original injury was a
cut finger which, as a result of medical care, resulted in a stroke. The 50 percent award and
its apportionment were both reversed and the cause remanded for further consideration.
51. 234 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1970).
52. For additional permanent total awards supported by competent substantial evidence,
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V. MEDICAL BENEFITS
Little activity has taken place in the medical benefits section of the
Workmen's Compensation Act.53 In Davis v. Conger Life Insurance Com-
pany,54 a treating physician retained the services of a heart specialist. The
consultation and treatment by the heart specialist were found to be reason-
ably secondary to the services performed by the treating physician. There-
fore, the employer and carrier were responsible for payment of the
specialist's fee even though there was no request or authority for a
medical consultation. Payment of medical bills was also upheld where a
claimant selected her own physicians after being advised by the em-
ployer's representative that she could see any doctor that she wished.55
An apportioned award for nursing attendance services was upheld
in the case of Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Weaver.56 In that case,
the injured workman's condition was such that he required an unlicensed
practical nurse full-time in the dual capacity of nurse and housekeeper.
The workman was able to dress himself, prepare and take his own medica-
tion, feed himself, and perform bathroom functions unassisted. However,
he was unable to make his bed, clean his house or do his own shopping.
These activities were carried out by the workman's attendant who also
prepared his food, did his laundry and carried on his general correspon-
dence. The attendant also performed the functions usually carried out by
a practical nurse, such as administering medicines and assisting the work-
man in bathing. The practical nursing care was held to be compensable.
However, the attendant's care which would not mitigate or relieve the




Florida Statutes section 440.02(1)(b)(2) (1969), defines employ-
ment covered by the act in which three or more employees are employed
by the same employer. The section was construed in Sudler v. Sun Oil
Company," wherein the Judge of Industrial Claims held that the em-
ployer was not covered under the Workmen's Compensation Act since he
did not have three or more full-time employees. In reversing the order,
see Florida Turnpike Auth. v. Garvey, 234 So.2d 354 (Fla. 1970). See also South Atlantic
Ship Builders, Inc. v. Taylor, 234 So.2d 97 (Fla. 1970).
53. FLA. STAT. § 440.13 (1969).
54. 201 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1967).
55. Repasky v. Juniors Restaurant, 224 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1969). For a concurring opinion
setting forth the power of selection of a physician and authority of the Judge of Industrial
Claims to determine disputes regarding medical selections, see Perez v. F. W. Woolworth Co.,
220 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1969).
56. 226 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1969).
57. Practical nursing care was upheld in McHahon v. Huntington, 246 So.2d 743 (Fla.
1971). Denial of medical care through self-deterioration and estoppel was upheld in John E.
Feldman, Inc. v. Hires, 225 So.2d 519 (1969).
58. 227 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1969).
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the supreme court held that the act applies where there are three or more
regular employees regardless of the hours of their work.
The fact that an accident or a death occurs outside Florida does not
preclude coverage under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act. In
Hanover Insurance Company v. Industrial Commission,59 a workman was
killed in the Bahamas while working for a Florida corporation. The work-
man's employment was not exclusively outside of the state. At the time
of the accident, his employer had two insurance carriers. Benefits were
granted under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act for which the
insurance companies were jointly and equally liable.
Judicial disfavor over the lack of coverage for farm workers was
apparent in Miranda v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Com-
pany.60 In that decision, the supreme court reviewed the background of
the exclusion of agricultural workers from benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act as well as decisions establishing exceptions to the
exclusion. The court then affirmed an award of benefits to a field foreman
who was found by a Judge of Industrial Claims not to be engaged in
"agricultural labor" within the meaning and intent of the Florida Work-
men's Act.
In Fernandez v. Consolidated Box Company,6 an employee was
assaulted while changing a tire on his own vehicle. The vehicle was parked
on a street which intersected with the employer's premises and which was
used by the employees for parking. The court held the injury compensable
as one having occurred on the employer's premises. The evidence indicated
that while legal title to the street reposed with the City of Tampa, the
employer had encroached upon it to the extent that the status of the street
became a factual issue which was resolved in the claimant's favor.
6 2
Generally, accidents occurring when the employee is going to, or
coming from, work are not covered under the act and, therefore, are not
compensable. However, in Grillo v. Gurney Beauty Shops Company, 3
the traveling supervisor was injured while returning from her employer's
place of business in North Carolina to her home in Florida. Evidence that
the employer provided an airline credit card so that the employee could fly
or rent a car at any time supported the claimant's theory of an implied
contract to furnish transportation between North Carolina and Florida.
The furnishing of transportation by the employer was held to be an excep-
tion to the "going-to-and-coming-from" rule.64 However, where the fur-
nished transportation was not used for its intended purpose but rather
59. 234 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1970).
60. 229 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1969).
61. 249 So.2d 434 (Fla. 1971).
62. For a denial of benefits to an employee who slipped on a public sidewalk and fell
forward into the open entrance of the employer's building where she injured her arm when
it struck the second and third steps leading to the lobby, see Greenberg v. Creative Group
Advertising, 219 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1969) (dissenting opinion).
63. 249 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1971).
64. Huddock v. Grant Motor Co., 228 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1969).
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on a personal mission, an accident while on the personal mission in the
company provided vehicle was held noncompensable.65 The special meet-
ing or special mission exception to the "going-to-and-coming-from" rule
was upheld in Krause v. West Lumber Company.6 In Warg v. City of
Miami Springs,67 the occupational exception to the "going-to-and-coming-
from" rule was affirmed. In the Warg case, the claimant was a policeman
who was going home from work in his own vehicle when involved in an
accident within the city limits of the City of Miami Springs. In its opinion,
the court reviewed its prior decisions as well as decisions from other juris-
dictions and reinstated the award of compensability.
Coverage questions regarding loaned employees and special em-
ployers require the establishment of a contract, express or implied, between
the special employer and the employee. Since the contract is frequently
an implied one, factors demonstrating a consensual relationship, such as
benefits, right of control, and payment of compensation must be proved.
These factors were found to be absent in Shelby Mutual Insurance Com-
pany v. Aetna Insurance Company,8 where the death of the employee
was held to remain with the general employer.
VII. THE COMPENSABLE ACCIDENT
In order to receive compensation, it is incumbent upon the claimant to
show only that he sustained injury as an unexpected result flowing from
the performance of his employment activities.69 The denial of benefits due
to lack of accident was reversed in Wilhelm v. Westminster Presbyterian
Church."' In Wilhelm, the claimant, a 64-year-old janitor-custodian, had
helped the pastor carry a 300 pound couch down a flight of stairs. That
night, the claimant experienced back discomfort and took Anacin. He
returned to work in pain, which continued to persist. Seven days later, he
sought medical care at which time a herniated disc was diagnosed. The
Judge of Industrial Claims found no accident but, rather, that the claim-
ant's injuries occurred in turning in bed. In reversing the denial of bene-
fits, the supreme court noted that the claimant had no prior back injuries
and that the event of carrying the 300 pound couch was a logical cause for
the claimant's herniated disc, since there had been no showing of a more
logical cause.
In Tracy v. Americana Hotel,7 ' a claimant was found to have received
a compensable injury when her blood pressure rose due to events of her
employment and suddenly resulted in a ruptured aneurysm and conse-
65. Central Air Conditioning Co. v. Garren, 239 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1970).
66. 227 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1969).
67. 249 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1971).
68. 246 So.2d 98 (Fla. 1971).
69. Williams v. Terrazzo Associates, 224 So.2d 257 (Fla. 1968).
70. 235 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1970).
71. 234 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1970).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
quent brain damage. However, in Board of Commissioners v. Breneman,7 2
an award of death benefits was reversed due to lack of causal relationship
between the claimant's injury and his employment. The claim was made
that employment-connected activities resulting in stress and anxiety had
elevated the deceased's blood pressure causing transient hypertension
which, in turn, acted upon a congenital weakness in the employee's cerebral
vascular system and resulted in his death. The court found that this con-
tention was based on a medical "possibility" and therefore insufficient to
prove a compensable injury.
In conformity with prior decisions, the finding of accident was upheld
in Brito v. Advance Metal Products, Inc.73 In Brito, the claimant, a welder
for six years with the employer, had been exposed to smoke while welding.
Due to the smoke and fumes of welding, he suddenly became unable to
breathe through his nose. Although the claimant had a disabling preexist-
ing condition in his nose and, on the day of the accident, he had not been
exposed to more smoke than usual, the Judge of Industrial Claims granted
compensation benefits. The full Commission reversed. On certiorari, the
supreme court reversed the Commission and directed that the order of the
Judge of Industrial Claims be reinstated holding that the ill effects of the
exposure must neither occur suddenly nor be immediately related to an
identifiable accident in order to be compensable.
VIII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The doctrine of estoppel was applied in three of the five statute of
limitations decisions handed down during the period surveyed. The em-
ployer was estopped to raise the statute of limitations where an author-
ized physician had recommended treatment but his recommendation was
never communicated to the claimant until after the statute of limitations
ran.u4 The doctrine of estoppel was also used to prevent the usage of the
defense of the running of the statute of limitations where it was found that
the claimant had been misled into believing his claim was open, 75 and where
the claimant was lulled into a false sense of security. 6
Estoppel was not applicable, and the statute was held to have run,
where a claimant filed his claim six years after his accident. The claimant
knew that he was receiving medical care under the employer's accident
and sickness benefit program and group insurance medical benefits. In
addition, although he was doing light work, he was receiving less pay. 
7
A claim for benefits was also held to be barred by the running of the statute
of limitations for failure to file a claim within two years after the last
72. 233 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1970).
73. 244 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1971).
74. Jenkins v. M. H. Harrison Constr. Co., 228 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1969).
75. Engle v. Deerborn School, 226 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1969).
76. Catalano v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 249 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1971).
77. Chemstrand Co. v. Enfinger, 231 So.2d 816 (Fla. 1970).
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payment of compensation or after the last remedial treatment or attention
provided by the employer.?8
IX. JUDGE OF INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS
In a workmen's compensation case, it is the responsibility of the
Judge of Industrial Claims to hear the testimony and receive the evidence,
to weigh the evidence including the inferences to be drawn therefrom, and
to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Evidence includes the demeanor of
witnesses and other facets of proof-making that are more accurately
weighed by the trier of fact who presides over the hearing than by a
reviewing panel scanning the cold record. The fact that evidence relied
upon by the Judge of Industrial Claims may be in duspute is not grounds
for disturbing his conclusions. It is the responsibility of the judge to make
findings of fact grounded on the evidence; and it is settled law that these
findings of fact are not to be disturbed if supported by substantial com-
petent evidence which accords with logic and reason. 9
In assessment of wage earning capacity, the Judge of Industrial
Claims must consider whether the claimant is acutally able to perform the
requirements of the type of work he was doing at the time the disability
occurred.80 He has the authority to choose the testimony of one physician
over another,8 ' and is in a position to evaluate the testimony and measure
the credibility of witnesses.82 Included in the powers of the Judge of
Claims is the power to dismiss a claim for failure of a claimant to submit
to a statutorily required medical examination or scheduled deposition.8
After reviewing the general policy of Workmen's Compensation Laws,
it was held in the case of Firemen's Fund Insurance Company v. Rich, 4
that Judges of Industrial Claims have jurisdiction to determine whether
an insurance policy which was terminated by its terms can remain in effect
by estoppel or under an oral renewal binder.
Section 440.25(3) (c) of the Florida Statutes (1969) requires that
the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims set forth the findings of
"ultimate facts." In reviewing a "short form" order entered pursuant to
section 440.25(3) (c), the supreme court in Brown v. Griffin" held that
the term "ultimate facts" means those facts which are sufficiently definite
and detailed to enable the reviewing authority to test the validity under
the law of the decision resting upon those facts. In so holding, the prior
78. Wainwright v. Wainwright, Inc., 237 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1970). The statute of limita-
tions was an additional basis for denying benefits, the Judge of Industrial Claims having
found there was no waiver on the part of the employer on the merits of the case.
79. Tenbroeck v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 243 So.2d 592 (Fla. 1971).
80. Harris v. Lenk, 224 So.2d 283 (Fla. 1969).
81. Ezell-Titterton, Inc. v. A.F.K., 234 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1969). Here, the evidence relied
upon by the judge was found not to be sufficiently substantial to justify his finding.
82. Stokes v. Sabre Corp., 220 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1969).
83. John Gaul Constr. Co. v. Harbin, 247 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1971).
84. 220 So.2d 369 (Fla. 1969).
85. 229 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1969).
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case law establishing the competent substantial evidence rule was adhered
to.86 The failure on the part of a Judge of Industrial Claims to consider
the existing disabilities known to the employer as a predicate for Special
Disability Fund consideration as well as the particular findings based on
medical evaluations were held to represent a denial of essential require-
ments of law.
7
The obligation of the Judge of Industrial Claims to conduct an ad-
ditional evidentiary hearing where an order is reversed and remanded was
clarified in Brock v. Sey Construction Corp."8 There, the cause was
remanded by an order authorizing the judge to conduct further hearings
if necessary. The testimony upon which the prior order was based was
approximately 2 years-old. The judge entered a new order without afford-
ing the parties the opportunity to present further evidence. In reversing
the order, the court stated:
All these factors merely point out the need for an additional
hearing. The case was old, and it appears that the JIC merely
copied the original order and added some findings. While it is
true that the Full Commission remanded only for lack of suffi-
cient findings of ultimate facts, there is no reason to believe that
the ultimate facts as found are still accurate. Under these cir-
cumstances it is an abuse of discretion to fail to grant an addi-
tional hearing to allow the parties to submit further testimony. 9
Absent mistake or fraud, a succeeding Judge of Industrial Claims
cannot reconsider his predecessor's final judgments and orders upon the
merits where the facts remain unchanged. In the event, however, that sub-
sequent events may defeat a prior judgment, the successor does have the
authority, even after final judgment, to make such further orders as may
be necessary to effectuate the judgment. Also, where the final judgment or
order is not complete, the succeeding judge may supply the element which
may have been omitted. The succeeding judge does have the authority to
vacate or modify interlocutory rulings or orders of his predecessor. 90
X. THE FULL CoMMIssIoN
As an appellate review body, the full Commission has the statutory
obligation to affirm, reverse, modify or remand. As far as factual matters
are concerned, it must do so on the basis of the findings of fact of the
trial judge and not on separate, substituted findings of its own." The
86. In rapid succession, a series of cases were remanded for adequate findings of fact
based upon the Brown v. Griffin decision.
87. Williams v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 247 So.2d 59 (Fla. 1971). The supreme
court found that the result reached by the Judge of Industrial Claims was unusual and para-
doxical in light of the particular facts of the case.
88. 237 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1970).
89. Id. at 162.
90. Tingle v. Board of County Comm'rs, 245 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1971).
91. Painter v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 223 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1969).
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full Commission is powerless to disturb findings of fact made by the Judge
of Industrial Claims which are supported by competent substantial evi-
dence. 2 The fact that there is other evidence in the record which would
support a different conclusion does not give the full Commission the
authority to reverse an order of the Judge of Industrial Claims. 3 Nor
may a reversal be effectuated under a full Commission's finding that the
order is against the manifest weight of the evidence, 4 not reasonable, 5
or upon the feeling that there is a "credibility gap."9 , However, where
all the testimony has been taken by deposition the full Commission is in
as good a position to measure the credibility of witnesses as is the Judge
of Industrial Claims. 7
Due process of law entitles parties to administrative review by the
full Commission."' In St. Moritz Hotel v. Daughrty,"" a supplemental
order was entered by a Judge of Industrial Claims. An application for
review was not timely taken from the original order but was timely taken
from the second order. The application for review was dismissed as being
untimely filed with the full Commission. The full Commission felt that
the second, or supplemental order, did not go to the merits, but merely
corrected a scrivener's error. In reversing the commission and remanding
the cause to it for consideration, the supreme court stated:
But where the modification or amendment materially changes the
original order or judgment, the limitation period is said to run
from the time of such modification or amendment.100
In Lewis v. Sperry Auto Sales,1" 1 a reversal by the full Commission
of an order of the Judge of Industrial Claims without notice to the parties
and without giving them opportunity to be heard was not, under the
circumstances, a material departure from the essential requirements of the
law. In Lewis, a Judge of Industrial Claims entered an order finding
jurisdiction over an employer who had rejected the act. The Commission
remanded the cause to permit the Judge of Industrial Claims to receive
into evidence a certificate of the director of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. The remand was found to be clearly in the interests of justice.
In Industrial Commission v. Neal,1°' it was held that the full Com-
mission was illegally constituted in that the chairman was not impartial
92. Meadows v. Curly's Trash Serv., Inc., 244 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1971); Krause v. West
Lumber Co., 227 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1969); Grims v. Super-X Drugs, Inc., 224 So.2d 301 (Fla.
1969).
93. Tenbroeck v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 243 So.2d 592 (Fla. 1971).
94. Williams v. Alfred S. Austin Constr. Co., 224 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1969).
95. Harris v. Lenk, 224 So.2d 283 (Fla. 1969).
96. Stokes v. Sabre Corp., 220 So.2d 625 (Fla. 1969).
97. Mendivil v. Tampa Envelope Mfg. Co., 233 So.2d 5 (Fla. 1970).
98. Southgate Towers Restaurant v. Knell, 247 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1971).
99. 249 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1971).
100. Id. at 28.
101. 224 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1969).
102. 224 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
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by reason of background as required by statute. However, it was noted
that the Governmental Reorganization Act had changed the law and
requirements regarding the chairman.
XI. REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT
Judicial review of Industrial Commission orders has not changed
since the last survey. The function of the court, insofar as examination
of the evidence is concerned, is to ascertain whether there is evidence
legally sufficient to support the finding made by the officers of the execu-
tive department whose decisions are under examination."' 8 The court will
not substitute its judgment for that of the Judge of Industrial Claims
where there is competent substantial evidence to support the order.'
However, in Ezell-Tritterton, Inc. v. A.F.K.,10 5 the supreme court stated
that what constitutes competent substantial evidence in an acknowledg-
ment case must necessarily be determined from the circumstances of each
individual case. The opinion in the case was a lengthy one and concerned
itself with the reversal of an award of death benefits to a claimant, an
alleged posthumous, illegitimate daughter of the deceased employee. The
focal point of the reversal was the lack of competent substantial evidence
to support the decedent's acknowledgment of parentage of the child prior
to his death. The opinion of the court was not unanimous. The dissenting
opinion indicated the reliance which the court normally places upon
Judges of Industrial Claims to correctly evaluate and determine the
credibility of the testimony.
Although it is not the function of the court to explore the record
and construct factual findings at the appellate level, the court has done so
where the findings of the Judge of Industrial Claims are meager. 10 6 Also,
it has considered issues not considered by the full Commission, in order to
bring judicial labor to an end. 0 7
Motion practice before the court was again discouraged during the
period surveyed,"0 8 and petitions not timely filed were dismissed.0 9 Judi-
cial review was accepted in a case in which the full Commission appeared
before the court and claimed its order was interlocutory and not review-
able; the court found that there had been elements of finality in the
order." o
103. Brown v. Griffin, 229 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1969).
104. Clayton v. Lease-Way Transp. Corp., 236 So.2d 765 (1970).
105. 234 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1970).
106. Salazar v. Jules Gillette, Inc., 243 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1970).
107. Tracy v. Americana Hotel, 234 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1970). The court remanded the
cause to the Commission for consideration of issues not determined by the full Commission
in Knell v. Southgate Towers Restaurant, 235 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1970). See also Southgate
Towers Restaurant v. Knell, 247 So.2d 57 (Fla. 1971).
108. Moore v. Grant-Sholk Constr. Co., 248 So.2d 647 (Fla. 1971).
109. Dave's Auto Parts v. Westberry, 220 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1969); Elliott v. Goodwill
Indus., 220 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1969).
110. Matthews v. Seaboard Properties, Inc., 250 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1971).
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
XII. AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE
During the biennium, four cases were decided concerning average
weekly wage. In the first case, a claimant was killed after working for
the employer for a total period of nine days during which he earned
$114.53. Of this sum, $83.13 was earned during the work week prior to
his death. It was stipulated that there was no similar employee. The
Judge of Industrial Claims found the average weekly wage to be $83.13.
The employer and carrier sought review claiming that, at the time of
the death, the employee's wage rate was $1.75 an hour for an expected
40-hour work week, or $70.00 per week. In affirming the award, it was
held that the full-time weekly wages may be determined either by the
contract of employment or actual earnings, according to the circumstances
of each case. In the instant case, the circumstances showed that the find-
ing of $83.13 was justified."" If, at the time of accident, the claimant
is engaged in concurrent similar employment, the earnings derived from
the concurrent similar employment may be combined with the earnings
derived from the employment wherein the claimant is injured to arrive
at the average weekly wage. However, if the concurrent similar employ-
ment is of a type specifically excluded from the operation of the act, i.e.,
farm work, the earnings are not includable for average weekly work
purposes." 2
In determining average weekly wage, the amount of tips received
and the reasonable value of uniforms must be included." 3 The Judge of
Industrial Claims has the authority to reconcile conflicts between the
claimant's assertion of the amount of tips received and the employer's
business records reflecting the amount of tips reported." 4
XIII. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Consistent with the court's prior decision in the Lee Engineering
case,1 5 awards of attorneys' fees without any evidentiary support as to
their reasonable value were consistently remanded during the period
surveyed." 6 A stipulation between the parties that the Judge of Industrial
Claims may set the fee was held to be insufficient in Brock v. Sey Con-
struction Corporation."17 In Brock, the court stated that there must be
some evidence in the record to reflect the reasonable value of the services
rendered.
111. Penuel v. Central Crane Serv., 232 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1970).
112. Jay Livestock Market v. Hill, 247 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1971). The opinion in this case
was not unanimous.
113. Torres v. Eden Roc Hotel, 238 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1970).
114. Cornaros v. Carillon Hotel, 235 So.2d 478 (Fla. 1970).
115. Lee Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Fellows, 209 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1968).
116. Tenbroeck v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 243 So.2d 592 (Fla. 1971); Southern
Line Constructors v. Morris, 231 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1970); Steele v. Pendarvis Chevrolet, Inc.,
220 So.2d 372 (Fla. 1969).
117. 237 So.2d 160, 163 (Fla. 1970).
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In Davis v. Edwin M. Green, Inc.,"x8 a denial by the Judge of In-
dustrial Claims and the Industrial Relations Commission of attorneys'
fees was reversed by the supreme court. The court found that:
The Florida Workmen's Compensation Law does not con-
template that an employer may insulate itself from knowledge
that benefits may be due to the claimant and then, when its wall
of willfull ignorance is breached by claimant's attorney, com-
mence "voluntary" payments and resist payment of attorneys'
fees." 9
The Davis court went on to consider the case of an employer who does
not exercise his right to investigate and who forces the burden of proving
liability on the claimant. The court held that to the extent that claimant
requires the assistance of an attorney for depositions or other actions,
the employer is not protected from payment of attorneys' fees. Similarly,
the right to attorneys' fees is not extinquished by a dismissal of the pro-
ceedings under rule 3 and 11 where the claimant's attorney has already
earned an attorney's fee and refiled the same claim after the rule 3 and
11 dismissal. However, "a different result would be proper in those cases
where the second claim contains different allegations from the first and
in which a decision by the employer that benefits were due would not
represent a reversal of the employer's position."'120
Three cases during the survey period involved determination of
attorneys' fees where the compensation benefits had been altered at the
appellate level. The cases held that where an appeal results in the altera-
tion of workmen's compensation benefits upon which an award of attor-
neys' fees is based, the award of attorneys' fees must be redetermined.' 2 '
In Basford v. Florida Power & Light Company,'122 a permanent total
award was made and an attorney's fee awarded based, in part, on the
claimant's life expectancy. An appeal was taken and the claimant died
during the appeal. The Commission reversed the award of attorneys' fees
and ordered a remand for reconsideration and reduction. On certiorari,
the supreme court held that the claimant's subsequent death neither
terminated or reduced the prior award of attorneys' fees. However, the
court further held that it was impossible to determine from the present
findings whether the victory won by the claimant's attorney had any
monetary significance to the claimant. In this context only, the court
affirmed the remand of the cause for reconsideration of attorneys' fees.
118. 240 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1970).
119. Id. at 5.
120. Schollenberger v. City of Miami, 241 So.2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1970).
121. San Juan v. Hart Properties, Inc., 248 So.2d 466 (Fla. 1971) ; Torres v. Eden Roc
Hotel, 238 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1970) ; Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 235 So.2d 289 (Fla.
1969).
122. 246 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1971).
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XIV. WAIVER & ESTOPPEL
In one case, the court, noting that proceedings in compensation
cases are basically administrative, reversed an order of the full Commis-
sion which stated that the defense of estoppel must be pleaded. 23 The
doctrine of estoppel was used in another case to estop the claimant from
securing payment of nursing care where the claimant had been trained
in self-care but made no attempt to care for himself or take advantage of
additional training. 24 The doctrine of estoppel was indirectly presented
in another case dealing with the jurisdiction of an industrial judge to
determine whether an insurance policy which had terminated by its terms
could remain in effect.12 Lastly, estoppel was used in four separate cases
involving the statute of limitations. 26
Whether waiver by conduct exists is a question of fact for the Judge
of Industrial Claims to determine. In Knell v. Southgate Towers Restau-
rant,'127 a waiver was determined to exist in favor of the claimant. In
Wainwright v. Wainwright, Inc.,125 however, no waiver was found to have
taken place on behalf of the employer.
XV. PENALTIES
The penalty sections of the Workmen's Compensation Act were con-
strued on three separate occasions during the biennium. The application
of the 20 percent penalty to the entire benefits was conceded to be erro-
neous in Grims v. Super-X Drugs,, Inc. 29 There, the original award of
the Judge of Industrial Claims was remanded and subsequently reentered.
The judge applied the 20 percent penalty to the entire benefits awarded
under the new order which the claimant agreed was erroneous. The 20
percent penalty should have been applied to the benefits awarded in the
original order and the 10 percent penalty applicable to the benefits paid
thereafter.
Assessment of penalties was reversed in two separate cases where the
complicated nature of the cause and pleadings were such that the penalties
could not have been imposed, 30 and where the employer had no reason to
be on notice that there was any claim or prospective claim.'
123. Painter v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 223 So.2d 33 (Fla. 1969).
124. John E. Feldman, Inc. v. Hires, 225 So.2d 519 (Fla. 1969).
125. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Rice, 220 So.2d 369 (Fla. 1969).
126. Catalano v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 249 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1971); Chemstrand Co.
v. Enfinger, 231 So.2d 816 (Fla. 1970); Jenkins v. M.H. Harrison Constr. Co., 228 So.2d
911 (Fla. 1969); Engle v. Deerborn School, 226 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1969).
127. 235 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1970).
128. 237 So.2d 1S4 (Fla. 1970).
129. 224 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1969).
130. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 234 So.2d 661 (Fla. 1970).
131. Ezell-Titterton, Inc. v. A.F.K., 234 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1970).
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XVI. PROCEDUiRE
The procedure for filing claims with the Industrial Relations Com-
mission has not changed since the last survey. In Turner v. Keller Kitchen
Cabinets,' a claimant, through his attorney, filed a claim with the
Industrial Relations Commission but subsequently withdrew the claim
by letter and had a hearing cancelled. No formal order was entered dis-
missing the claim, but it was held that the first claim had been effectively
withdrawn. Subsequently, the claimant's wife directed a letter to the
Industrial Commission to inquire as to compensation benefits. The letter
was construed by the Judge of Industrial Claims to be a claim, thereby
tolling the statute of limitations. On review, the supreme court affirmed
the order of the Judge of Industrial Claims. The court cited prior deci-
sions to the effect that any paper lodged with the Commission indicating
the probability that the employee has not received compensation or
benefits is treated as a claim.
133
The burden of proof is upon the claimant to prove all of the elements
of his claim.134 In occupational disease claims, however, the claimant has
a greater burden of proof. Evidence adequate to establish other types
of compensation claims will not meet the requirements of occupational
diseases. In Norman v. Morrison Food Services,' 5 the supreme court held:
Further evidence is necessary to establish that claimant's contact
dermatitis results from the substances used in her employment.
This requires identification of the chemicals involved and the
manner and amount of exposure. If the substance causing the
dermatitis is shown to be a common household detergent claim-
ant used to clean the baking tables, the Judge of Industrial
Claims must find that the extent and manner of her exposure
exceeds that of the "general public" so as to constitute a "partic-
ular hazard" of her employment as required by the statute.'36
In the Norman case, the cause was remanded to the Judge of In-
dustrial Claims to hold further hearings and to receive further evidence
in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion. The court limited
further evidentiary hearings to a period of ninety days from its opinion.
The burden of proof may be met by showing a logical cause, as was
stated in Wilhelm v. Westminster Presbyterian Church:'3 7
However, we are also committed "to the doctrine that where a
serious injury is conclusively shown and a logical cause for it is
132. 247 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1971).
133. For a split decision holding an apparent contrary view, see the earlier decision and
dissenting opinion in Troyer v. Burnup & Sims, 222 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1969).
134. See Salazar v. Jules Gillette, Inc., 243 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1970) (elements proven in
hernia case). As to burden of proof, see Carr Constr. Co. v. Fertic, 239 So.2d 245 (Fla.
1970) (dissenting opinion).
135. 245 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1971).
136. Id. at 238.
137. 235 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1970).
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
proven, he who seeks to defeat recovery for the injury has the
burden of overcoming the established proof and showing that
another cause of the injury is more logical and consonant with
reason."
138
The burden shifts to the employer-carrier to establish a cause more
logical and reasonable than that established by the claimant only when
a claimant has first established a logical cause. In Snipes v. Gilman Paper
Company,39 there were numerous possible causes for the employee's
death, some which may have been employment-connected and others
possibly unrelated to employment. The Judge of Industrial Claims denied
the cause for death advanced by claimant. On appeal, the supreme court
found the denial was supported by competent substantial evidence. In
affirming the denial, the court stated that the claimant must establish
that the injury or death is caused by a single logical employment-con-
nected cause or by any one of several logical causes or a combination
thereof, all of which must necessarily be connected with the employment
of the deceased. The claimant failed to establish by competent substantial
evidence a logical cause for the death. Therefore, the employer-carrier
had no burden to demonstrate a cause of death unrelated to decedent's
employment more logical and consonant with reason than the claimant's.
In the presentation of expert medical opinion, it is necessary that
the medical expert have an accurate medical history of the claimant be-
fore he testifies as to the causal relationship between the accident and
the injury. In Payette v. Gulfstream Air-Conditioning, Inc.,140 a false
and incomplete history was given to the expert by the claimant. However,
the claimant's true history was later made clear to the physician and
his opinion regarding causal relationship remained the same. The award
of benefits was affirmed based upon the finding that there was competent
substantial evidence to support the award. In Warman v. Metropolitan
Dade County,'4 ' an award was affirmed where the expert medical opinion
was based on substantially correct history.
Compensation benefits were denied a claimant suffering from a rare
form of cancer about which medical science knew very little. The denial
was based upon lack of competent substantial evidence to support a
causal relationship. It was held that there must be some clear evidence,
rather than mere speculation or conjecture, establishing a causal con-
nection between a claimant's injury and the employment. No medical
evidence was presented which could connect the cancer to trauma which
occurred approximately one year earlier.'42 However, in an earlier case
involving injury resulting from aggravation of preexisting bulbous emphy-
138. Id. at 728, quoting Jim Rathman Cadillac, Inc. v. Barnard, 200 So.2d 161, 164
(Fla. 1967).
139. 224 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1969).
140. 224 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1969).
141. 228 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1969).
142. Police Dept. v. Hobbs, 246 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1971).
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sema due to inhalation of certain gases in the course of employment, an
award of benefits was upheld. In that case, the operating physician who
removed a portion of both of the claimant's lungs testified that, in his
opinion, exposure to the gases in question possibly could aggravate the
condition. After having been given a hypothetical question setting out the
circumstances of the claimant's exposure, the physician stated: "I would
say that I would be strongly suspicious that emphysema was a direct





Logical inferences may be used where there is a lack of direct evi-
dence to support a claim. In Zipperer v. Peninsular Life Insurance Com-
pany,'44 two salesmen whose employment required them to travel were
killed in an automobile accident. The injury occurred at night in a place
where they were reasonably expected to be. The facts were not in conflict.
There was only a short gap in time between the last admitted employ-
ment-related activities and the accident. That gap of time was found to
be insignificant when the whole evening's events were coupled with the
unquestioned custom of working late in the evening. In reversing the
denial of benefits, it was held that there was a fair, almost inescapable
inference, that the two salesmen were pursuing the employer's business
when killed.
Suspicious inferences were held insufficient to deny benefits to a
female sales solicitor who sustained injury when she jumped from a
window of a prospective land purchaser's apartment. 45 Such inferences
were also insufficient in the case of a claimant who failed to seek medical
treatment, failed to seek employment, and engaged in occasional hunting,
fishing and driving during a period when the evidence established his
condition to be totally disabled. 46
In appellate review of orders of the Judges of Industrial Claims and
the Industrial Commission, the competent substantial evidence law ap-
plies. However, in the celebrated case of Ezell-Titterton, Inc. v. A.
F.K., the supreme court stated:
But in the proper exercise of this Court's review function it
should evaluate the evidence in light of certain minimal stan-
dards contemplated by the act. Without these minimal standards
there will be no end to spurious and false claims in the type of
case before us.
48
Only one decision during the period surveyed dealt with the en-
forcement of workmen's compensation orders. In that case, the District
143. Walker v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 231 So.2d 210, 211 (Fla. 1970).
144. 235 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1970).
145. Shunk v. Gulf Am. Land Corp., 224 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1969).
146. Bays v. Board of County Comm'rs, 232 So.2d 391 (Fla. 1970).
147. 234 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1969). The skepticism with which the court looked upon the
findings of the Judge of Industrial Claims is reflected in the court's opinion and its pro-
nouncement regarding its function as an appellate review board.
148. Id. at 369 (dissenting opinion).
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Court of Appeal, Third District, found that the employer had complied
with the order in question and was not in default. The court stated that
the authority of the trial judge was such that he "could only make in-
quiry as to whether or not the order was still in full force and effect and
if it was, enforce its provision ... .149
XVII. COMMISSION RULES
Rules 3 and 11 came under judicial review during the survey period.
In Knight v. Munday Plastering Company,'5 great weight was given
the Industrial Commission's previous interpretations of rule 3 which
conflicted with its interpretation in the instant case. The present Com-
mission dismissed a claim which had been pending for approximately
three years without any hearings ever having been scheduled thereon.
In reversing the Commission, the court held that there must be a sched-
uled hearing before rule 3 would become operable. Once the rule is in-
voked, its operation becomes mandatory and cannot be relaxed by the
Judge of Industrial Claims on his own motion.' 5' However, the Judge of
Industrial Claims, on his own motion or otherwise, may recall a witness
for the purpose of clarifying his testimony in the event-and only in
the event-it has not been properly recorded. He may, if it becomes
necessary, appoint a disinterested physician to examine a claimant for
the purpose of aiding him in reconciling conflicts in the medical evi-
dence. 2
Rule 6, relating to insolvency petitions, was interpreted in Sweeney
v. Pine Island Citrus Groves, Inc.," wherein it was held:
Both the Judge of Industrial Claims and the Full Commission
erred in holding that this rule was mandatory. This and other
rules of the commission should be observed in the interests of
expediting the speedy determination of these administrative pro-
ceedings. Such rules, however, are not mandatory. For good
cause the Judge of Industrial Claims may, on application of
the employer and employee, exercise his judicial discretion in
granting or denying such relief. Ordinarily the exercise of such
discretion will not be disturbed on review except on a clear
showing of an abuse of power or an arbitrary exercise of
power .
1 4
Florida Appellate Rule 3.4(b) (3) provides, in part, that a three
day extension be allowed for service by mail. In Conception v. Southern
149. Lillard v. City of Miami, 220 So.2d 413, 413-14 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969), quoting
Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Merritt, 160 So.2d 552, 553 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
150. 220 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1968).
151. Perez v. Carillon Hotel, 231 So.2d 519 (Fla. 1970).
152. Kramer v. Chapman & Gerber, Inc., 235 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1970).
153. 234 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1970).
154. Id. at 645.
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General Builders, Inc.,55 the supreme court, in deciding the case on
other grounds, failed to directly pass on the petitioner's argument that
rule 3.4(b)(3) governs workmen's compensation review.
XVIII. THIRD PARTIES
The exclusive remedy doctrine of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
which limits recovery of injured employees to Workmen's Compensation
benefits, was again construed during the survey period. In Collins v.
Federated Mutual Implement & Hardward Insurance Company,'56 an
employer was in the process of building a road and required additional
trucks. Trucks were leased for that purpose. The defendant was the owner
and driver of one of the trucks. While operating the truck for the em-
ployer, the defendant struck and injured the plaintiff. In reversing the
trial judge's finding that the defendant was an independent contractor,
it was found, using the principle of the right to control, that the defendant
was under the control and supervision of the employer of the plaintiff.
Defendant was acting in the status of a coemployee or fellow servant
and was, therefore, a third party tort-feasor under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. In Hamilton v. Shell Oil Company,15 7 the third party suit
was dismissed under a finding that the plaintiff was a special employee of
the defendant. In this case, the defendant had a contract with Manpower,
Incorporated to supply defendant's employees.
Servicing agents for self-insured employers became defendants on
two separate occasions in third party actions. In Allen v. Employers
Service Corporation,158 the servicing agent allegedly failed to properly
perform safety inspections thereby causing injury to plaintiff. Suit was
filed against the servicing agency. A summary judgment in favor of the
servicing agency was affirmed on the ground that anyone who stands in
the shoes of the employer, or who is in privity with the employer and
undertakes to perform or assist in the performance of the statutory duties
imposed on the employer, should be immune from suit as a third party
tort-feasor. However, in an earlier decision of Gallichio v. Corporate
Group Service, Inc., 5' the claimant was covered under the Federal Long-
shoremen & Harbor Workers Act. He brought suit against the servicing
agent for the self-insured employer, claiming the servicing agent failed
to make proper safety inspections. A dismissal was reversed under the
theory that the claimant was third party beneficiary and the cause was
remanded. The 1970 session of the legislature amended the exclusive
remedy provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act so as to include
servicing agents for self-insured employers. °
155. 219 So.2d 425 (Fla. 1969).
156. 247 So.2d 461 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
157. 233 So.2d 179 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
158. 243 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
159. 227 So.2d 519 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
160. See note 5, supra.
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In Trail Builders Supply Company v. Reagan,161 an injured employee
sued a manufacturer of a machine upon which he was injured and from
which the employer wilfully removed a safety device. The manufacturer
filed a cross-claim against the employer which the employer moved to
dismiss. The suit was originally filed in federal court and the matter was
referred to the Supreme Court of Florida for an opinion. The supreme
court held that the employer was liable to the defendant manufacturer on
the cross-claim:
Accordingly, we hold that the Workmen's Compensation Act
does not preclude a passively negligent third party tort-feasor
from being indemnified by an actively negligent employer who
has made payments of compensation and medical benefits to an
injured employee in a suit for damages by such employee against
a third party where it is alleged in the claim for idemnity that
the employer's act of negligence was primarily responsible for
the injury.'62
A similar result was held in Florida Gas Company v. Spaulding,"6 3
wherein a workman was killed as a result of an explosion which occurred
when the machine he was operating struck the defendant's gas main. The
defendant filed a third party complaint against the employer seeking
indemnity. A summary judgment in favor of the employer, affirmed
by the district court of appeal, was reversed by the supreme court based
upon the Trail Builders case. Again, the 1971 legislature acted and ex-
tended the exclusive liability of the employer to third party tort-feasors.16
XIX. SUBROGATION AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Company v. Bortz,6 5 it was held that
during the second year following injury, a carrier who brought suit and
settled the suit was nonetheless entitled to only equitable distribution
from the recovery rather than full benefits. The decision was based upon
a liberal construction of the act in favor of the claimant. During the
second year following the accident, both the injured workman and the
employer or carrier have the right to file a third party suit. The one
filing the suit first has the right to maintain the cause of action. 66 Where
no suit is filed during the second year, but the injured workman settled
his case with the third party carrier, the compensation recovery is based
upon equitable distribution rather than upon a 100 percent recovery. 7
When the injured employee initiates the third party action, the com-
161. 235 So.2d 482 (Fla. 1970).
162. Id. at 485.
163. 243 So.2d 129 (Fla. 1970).
164. See note 6, supra.
165. 246 So.2d 114 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). The decision was not unanimous, there being
a dissenting opinion.
166. Jersey Ins. Co. v. Cuttriss, 220 So.2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
167. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Smith, 247 So.2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
pensation carrier's proper procedure is to protect its right of subrogation
by the filing of a notice of payment of compensation and medical benefits.
The notice is recorded, and thereafter constitutes a lien upon any judg-
ment recovery to the extent determined by the court under the provisions
of the statute. It is an improper joinder of parties for the carrier to be a
party-plaintiff. 1 8
Jurisdiction by Florida courts over equitable distribution of work-
men's compensation benefits paid under the Florida act was held to lie
in Reznick v. Schwartz."" In that case, the plaintiff was injured in
Minnesota while working for a Florida corporation. Plaintiff was paid
compensation under the Florida act, filed suit in federal court in Min-
nesota and subsequently settled the case. A lien was filed in federal
court by the workmen's compensation carrier. When the parties could
not agree as to the extent of equitable distribution, the plaintiff filed suit
in Florida to determine the carrier's right to equitable distribution and
the extent thereof. On the carrier's appeal from an award of equitable
distribution, it was held that Florida had jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
The extent of equitable distribution is in the discretion of the trial
judge who may take into consideration the conduct of the parties.
70
XX. ADDITIONAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST
In DeCancino v. Eastern Airlines,171 a stewardess was injured during
a flight from Florida to New York when the plane hit an air pocket
over South Carolina. Initial proceedings filed in New York were dismissed
after which the claimant filed a claim in Florida. The Florida claim was
dismissed by the Industrial Relations Commission for lack of jurisdiction.
In reversing the Commission, the court cited the statute which permits
the filing of claims in both jurisdictions but permits offsetting the amount
of benefits received so that the total benefits do not exceed what might
have been awarded in a Florida forum.
172
The Industrial Commission's refusal to take jurisdiction with
reference to a group insurance claim was held erroneous in Jewel Tea
Company v. Industrial CommisionY'8 In that case, the plaintiff sustained
injury and received benefits during the first 39 weeks of his disability
through payment under a group insurance package plan to which he
contributed 2 dollars a week from his salary and to which the employer
also contributed. The package plan included medical benefits as well as
monetary weekly benefits. The employer's claim for credit against work-
168. National Emblem Ins. Co. v. Gillingham, 241 So.2d 707 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
169. 219 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
170. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roth, 222 So.2d 768 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969); Jackson v.
Singer, 221 So.2d 783 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
171. 239 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1970).
172. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(1) (1969).
173. 235 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1969).
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men's compensation liability for benefits paid under the insurance pack-
age plan was denied, the court holding the result to be a violation of the
statute . 4 The claimant was held to be entitled to workmen's compensa-
tion in addition to any benefits under the insurance plan to which he
contributed.
In Colonial Restaurant Corporation v. Department of Commerce,17
members of a self-insurance fund had failed to pay their assessments. The
Industrial Commission entered an order directing payment of the back
assessment. The order was not complied with. A rule nisi was then sought
by the trustees of the self-insurance fund. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, held that the payment of delinquent assessments may be
enforced in the circuit court to the same extent as any other delinquent
compensation order.
Notice to an employer of the claimant's preexisting disability was
held to be established solely by the testimony of the employee in Pompano
Pipelayers Company, Inc. v. Special Disability Fund . 76
Under the competent substantial evidence rule, a lump sum pay-
ment in the amount of $22,250 was upheld in Herndon v. City of
Miami.7 7 In that case, the lump sum was an advance payment of com-
pensation without an accompanying release of future liability. It was
held that the judge is given vast discretion to determine the interests
of the claimant and employer; that there is no mandatory requirement
in the Workmen's Compensation Act that the claimant produce expert
testimony to testify at a hearing to obtain an advance payment of com-
pensation; and that the judge's order and findings should not be disturbed
unless he has abused his discretion or unless there is no competent sub-
stantial evidence to support the order.
In the single modification order reviewed, the granting of modi-
fication was reversed by the Industrial Relations Commission under its
conclusion that the claimant's physical condition had not changed, since
it appeared that he could not work at the time of the original order under
which he was granted permanent partial disability benefits and the same
appeared true in the modification proceedings. The Judge of Industrial
Claims found both a mistake of fact and a steady worsening of claimant's
condition. In reversing the Industrial Relations Commission and rein-
stating the award of permanent total disability, the supreme court said:
[T]he plain fact remains that the evidence presented in support
of modification indicates a transpiration of the events cogently
indicative of the incompatibility of the prior determination with
the real extent of Petitioner's disabilities. . . .[T]o hold that
Petitioner is not entitled to modification of the earlier determina-
tion so as to conform his compensation award to the existing
174. FLA. STAT. § 440.21 (1969).
175. 248 So.2d 494 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
176. 245 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1971).
177. 224 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1969).
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realities of his disability would unduly thwart the liberal purposes
sought to be accomplished by F.S.A. Section 440.28.178
XXI. CONCLUSION
The period surveyed has seen a broadening of coverage of the Florida
Workmen's Compensation Act both legislatively and judicially. The
authority of the Judge of Industrial Claims in his fact finding powers was
consistently supported and his powers in regulating and handling the
case loads before him enhanced.
The exclusive remedy doctrine was fortified by both sessions of the
legislature in order to overcome judicial decisions allowing liability,
thereby eliminating possible tort liability on the part of the employer or
its servicing agents.
Initial review authority is still with the full Commission. For the
first time in the history of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act,
the full three-member Commission is composed entirely of lawyers.
It is anticipated that there will be a significant reduction in judicial
activity and a continuation of legislative broadening of benefits and
coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act in the future.
178. Arnold v. Stroud, 221 So.2d 729, 731-32 (Fla. 1969).
